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ERNST C. STIEFEL & JAMES R. MAXEINER

Civil Justice Reform in the United StatesOpportulllity for Learning from 'Civilized' European
Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?
European jurists have long urged that their American colleagues
consider using continental approaches in dealing with the serious
problems that afflict the American system of civil justice. A few years
back, our colleague Ktitz noted that "If there is a desire to reform
American civil procedure, either by making changes within the adversary system or by developing alternative methods of dispute resolution, the Continental experience may be well worth studying."l
Today, agitation for civil justice reform in the United States is at
a level not seen in a very long time. 2 Moreover, unlike previous periods of reform, proponents of reform have no clear direction. Thus today there could be an opportunity for Americans to learn from
European experiences such as they have not before. In this article, we
report on present and past efforts at civil justice reform in the United
States and assess the opportunities for learning from Continental
models.

I.

THE THREE REFORMS IN AMERICA

The American system of civil justice is under attack now like
never before in memory. President Bush charged that America, "The
home of the free," has become the "land of the lawsuit."3 "Crazy" lawERNST C. STIEFEL is Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School and Senior
Counsel, Coudert Brothers.
JAMES R. MAxE1NER is Attorney at Law. This article was originally published in Festschrift far Karl Beusch zum 68. Geburtstag am 31. Oktober 1993 at 853-69 (Heinrich
Beisse, Marcus Lutter & Heribal Niirger eds. 1993).
1. Katz, "The Reform of the Adversary System," 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 478, 486
(1981). The French jurist, Pierre LePaulle, who after expressing "his amazement at
the ineffective manner in which justice is administered ... more like a high church
ceremony than a business transaction," asked "Why don't you take advantage of what
has been done by the civil law, that governs at least twice as many people as the
common law, is two thousand years older, and embodies a much greater amount of
human experience?" Quoted in Sunderland, "Book Review," 15 AB.A.J. 35 (1929).
2. Civil justice reform in the United States can refer to both reform of civil procedure and to reform of substantive tort law. In this article we refer only to reform of
civil procedure; our discussion of Continental procedure is limited to German procedure, which probably has been the most discussed of European procedures.
3. Addresn in Atlanta, February 29, 1992.
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suits became a theme of the 1992 presidential election campaign.
Vice President Quayle became known as the "scourge of the legal profession" for leading the campaign for reform. 4 At the 1991 convention
of the American Bar Association (ABA) he charged that "staggering
expense and delay" make the American system "a self-inflicted competitive disadvantage" in the global economy.5 While the current
campaign is new, discontent with the justice system has been growing steadily for at least a decade. In 1984, the then Chief Justice of
the United States, Warren Burger, warned the ABA convention that
"Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient
for a truly civilized people."6 According to a recent article in the California Lawyer, "Clients, lawyers, judges and the general public all
seem to think that the cost of civil litigation in the United States is
out of control."7
Until now, there have been two principal reforms of civil procedure in the United States: one, beginning in 1848, when New York
adopted the so-called Field Code, and the other culminating in 1938,
when the national government adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 8 Neither ofthese two reforms drew on Continental models
of civil procedure or even gave foreign models meaningful consideration. But neither did they deliberately reject Continental models. Circumstances simply precluded real consideration of foreign
alternatives.

1.

The First Reform, the Field Code of 1848

The first great reform of American civil procedure presented no
opportunity for reference to German models. As John Langbein has
pointed out, German civil procedure then had not yet matured and
consequently could not have presented an attractive model even if the
reformers had been interested, which they were not. David Dudley
Field, who engineered that reform in New York in 1848, was indeed
aware of foreign law. 9 Field, the great advocate of codification in
America, drew much of his inspiration for codification as such from
4. New York Times, February 5, 1992, at A21.
.
5. Address in Atlanta, August 13, 1991, reprinted in Washington Legal Times,
August 19, 1991, at 9.
6. Address, February 13, 1984, quoted in 52 U.S. Law Week 2471 (February 28,
1984).
.
.
7. Stone, "Telling the Truth About Discovery," 12 California Lawyer, No.2 (February 1992) at 96.
8. See generally Bone, "Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of
Ideal Lawsuit Structure From the Field Code to the Federal Rules," 89 Col. L. Rev. 1
(1989).
9. Subrin, "David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an
Earlier Procedural Vision," 6 Law & Rist. Rev. 311, 318 (1988). Field's international
contacts extended to procedure. Maxeiner has a collection of five ofField's early procedural reform tracts inscribed from Field to C.F.A. Mittermaier, the great German
comparativist of the 19th century.
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Civil Law models, especially the French codes of Napoleon. His proposals for codification of the criminal law reported on developments
in Europe. But when it came to procedure, Field was a reformer who
"knew what was wrong with the existing procedural system and what
should be done about it."lO David Clark has pointed out that Continental influences in Field's code of civil procedure are largely of
French origin as transmitted through Livingston's code of civil procedure for Louisiana. l l
The Field approach to reform of civil procedure was historical,
not philosophical; it chose to restate existing law rather than adopt a
new system of law relying on foreign models. 12 What it did was to
unify a wide variety of different procedures. It substantially loosened
requirements for pleadings, which had required that the parties come
to a single issue oflaw or fact. It required that testimony previously
given in writing be given before a judge in open court. 13

2.

The Second Reform, The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

There was a better opportunity for German civil procedure to influence developments in the United States in the second major refonD. that culminated in the introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938. That reform can be traced to an address Roscoe
Pound delivered to the American Bar Association in 1906, "The
Causes ofthe Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. "14 Pound's address, besides being a clarion call for reform generally, is fairly regarded as an invitation to examine foreign solutions. 15
The early years of the 20th century saw the beginnings of a significant study in the United States of foreign law in general and of
German civil procedure in particular. Pound, the long time Dean of
Harvard law School, was himself a tireless proponent and practitioner of comparative law. In the year following the address to the
ABA, and despite the negative response the address received, the
ABA established a Comparative Law Bureau. It was organized by Si10. Bone, supra n. 8, at 114.
11. Clark, "The Civil Law Influence on David Dudley Fields Code of Civil Procedure," in The Reception of Continental Ideas in the Common Law World 1820-1920, at
63-87 (Mathias Reimann ed. 1993).
12. Reppy, "The Field Codification Concept," in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays 17, at 29-30 (Alison Reppy ed. 1949). The Final Report of the Practice Commission did acknowledge one explicit borrowing from foreign law: § 511 governing the
ethical duties of attorneys and counselors was taken from the laws of Geneva. 1
Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field at 297 (1884).
See Fisch, "ThEl Influence of German Civil Procedural Thinking and the ZPO in the
United States," in Das deutsche Zivilprozessrecht und seine'Ausstrahlung auf andere
Rechtsordnungen 400, at 405 (1991).
13. See Subrin, "How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective," 135 U. Penn. L. Rev. 908, at 931-39 (1987).
14. 40 American L. Rev. 729 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
15. See Maxeiner, "1992: High Time for American Lawyers to Learn from Europe,
or Roscoe Pound's 1906 Address Revisited," 15 Fordham·Int'l L. J. 1 (1991).
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meon E. Baldwin, a former President of the ABA and a student of
both U.S. and foreign civil justice systems who published a couple of
articles on German civil procedure. 16
Significant academic projects of the day included a procedural
component. The leading proponent of comparative study of civil procedure was Robert Wyness Millar, professor at Northwestern University, who wrote a number of works on comparative civil procedure in
the 1920s and 1930s; The most important of these was A History of
Continental Civil Procedure, a volume in the Continental Legal History Series. In this book, Millar reprinted material that he had published elsewhere and translated a contemporary German book on
civil procedure.1 7
The American legal community received Millar's book warmly.
The two professors who in the next decade came to be the principal
drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Charles Clark and
Edson Sunderland, both praised Millar's book and encouraged future
comparative study.18 In a review of Millar's book, Sunderland explained why foreign models of civil procedure had, until then, drawn
scant attention: because of (1) "professional prejudice against new
ideas, based on national conservation and the monopolistic nature of
judicial agencies"; and (2) "ignorance, because Americans aren't good
linguists and relevant materials are not readily available in English".
Yet despite the favorable reception of Millar's work, neither Clark
nor Sunderland nor anyone else seems to have considered foreign solutions in the actual drafting of the rules. 19
Even if American lawyers been able to overcome the twin obstacles of professional prejudice and linguistic ignorance, timing assured
that German civil justice would not be a model. While Pound began
the campaign for reform in 1906, Congress did not authorize it until
1934 and the reform was not adopted until 1938. By then Germany's
16. See Simeon Baldwin, The American Judiciary (1905); "A German Law Suit,"
19 Yale L.J. 69-79 (1909); "The German Law Suit Without Lawyers," 9 Mich. L. Rev.
30-38 (1909).
17. See Robert W. Millar, A History of Continental Civil Procedure (Continental
Legal History Series Vol. 7, 1927); "Formative Principles of German Procedure," 10
AB.AJ. 703-09 (1924); "Some Comparative Aspects of Civil Pleading Under AngloAmerican and Continental Systems," 12 A B.A. J. 401 (1926); "The Mechanism of
Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure," 32 Ill. L. Rev. 261-94,42455 (1937). See also Robert W. Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical
Perspective (Judicial Administration Series) (1952).
18. Book reviews included, inter alia, Clark, 37 Yale L.J. 680-82; Sunderland, 15
AB.A.J. 35-36; Blume, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 262-64; Lloyd, 76 U. Penn. L. Rev. 762-63.
19. Millar could hardly himself have brought about intensive study of foreign alternatives. According to Riesenfeld, Millar was more a sympathetic and sensitive recorder of advance than an apostle of reform. "Book Review," 41 Cal. L. Rev. 154 at 156
(1952). Millar's works, while technically accomplished, are dry scholarly works hardly
suited to develop a following among colleagues and students.
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judges had pinned swastikas on their robes and had sworn allegiance
to Hitler, who had dismantled the Rechtsstaat. 2o
Again, in 1938, as in 1848, it seems that the reformers knew
what they wanted. 21 They sought to restrict the pleadings to the task
of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process
with a vital role in preparation for trial. 22 They abolished a separate
equity jurisdiction in federal courts but adopted equity procedures for
general use. Equity procedures emphasized joining all relevant parties and issues, amassing all relevant data, and permitting the judge
to order what was fair and just. 23 The 1938 Federal Rules introduced
the wide-ranging, uncontrolled discovery now considered a feature of
U.S. civil procedure. It has led to a system where applying law to
facts is no longer the principal or even a main goal of the
proceedings. 24

3.

The 19908: Chance for a Third Reform?

Pressure for reform of the U.S. civil justice system is greater today than at any time since the first third of this century. The pressure has been building since 1976 when then Chief Justice Warren
Burger sponsored a conference to commemorate Pound's 1906 address. 25 Since that conference a number of ever-more distinguished
and ever more visible special comInittees have called for action.
These have included an ABA ComInis~ion in '1984 (1984 ABA Report),26 the private Brookings Institution, in 1989 (Brookings Report),27 a Congressional ComInittee in 1990 (Federal Courts Study
Committee),28 a Presidential Commission chaired by Vice President
Quayle (Quayle Report) in 1991,29 and yet another ABA committee in
20. The decline in German influence set in much earlier; it was coincident with
World War I. Mathias Reimann has observed: "Before 1914, praise of German legal
scholars abounded in the American literature; by 1918 it had by and large disappeared. Within a few years, and in an uncompromising manner that Llewellyn
deemed typical of common lawyers' attitude towards the civilian legal culture, American academics had lost interest in their German colleagues." Reimann, "A Career in
Itself: The German Professoriate as a Model for American Legal Academica," in Reimann, supra n. 11, at 165, 194 (citation omitted).
21. Bone, supra n. 8, at 114.
22. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
23. Subrin, supra n. 13, at 968.
24. Id. at 989, 1001-02.
25. The proceedings are reported in A. Leo Levin & Russell Wheeler (eds.), The
Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future (1979). Critiques of the adversary system since 1906 are summarized in Franklin D. Streier & Edith Greene, The
Adversary System: An Annotated Bibliography (1990).
26. American Bar Association, Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay, Final Report
of the Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs arid Delays (1984).
27. The Brookings Institution, Justice for All, Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil
Litigation, Report of a Task Force (1989).
28. U.S. Congress, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (1990).
29. U.S. President, Report from the President's Council on Competitiveness,
Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America (1991).
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1992 responding to the Quayle Report (the ABA Blueprint).3o Many
of the Quayle Report proposals took legislative form in the shape of
bills considered, but not passed, in Congress in 1992.31
All these reports, except the ABA Blueprint, agree that there is a
crisis in the U.S. civil justice system brought on by excessive cost and
delay. They concur in identifying the discovery phase of litigation as
the principal cause of that delay and expense. In reaching these conclusions, the committees merely voice conclusions· long obvious to
most of the bar. In 1980; Justice Powell of the Supreme Court, joined
by two other justices, dissented from approving amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that "the changes embodied
in the amendments fall short of those needed to accomplish reforms
in civil litigation that are long overdue." According to the justices,
"every judge and litigator knows" where the problem arises: "abuse of
the discovery procedure available under the [Federal] Rules. "32
Unlike the other reports, the ABA Blueprint, while entitled
"ABA Blueprint for Improving the Civil Justice System," is not so
much a manifesto for change as an apology for the status quo. It advocates steps "to maintain and enhance the excellence of America's
justice system. "33 The present crisis is not to be attributed to defects
in the system, but to "the decay caused by long-term neglect and underfunding of the entire justice system" and by "the extent to which
the civil justice system has been damaged by the increased burden on
the criminal justice system."34 The ABA Blueprint is typical of a
number of recent works that deprecate criticism by observing that
dissatisfaction with the legal system has always been with us or by
purporting to show that problems are not as severe as claimed. But
even the ABA Blueprint recognizes that there are serious problems
that have to be fIXed.
Lacking in any of the reform reports is a clear vision of what
reforms to implement. While the reports recognize that more than
"tinkering changes" are required,35 they offer nothing more than minor corrections that leave the existing system, with all its defects,
intact. None, for example, would fundamentally change discovery.
The minimal nature of the changes proposed is apparent even to opponents of change. The ABA Blueprint criticizes the Quayle Report
I)

30. American Bar Association, ABA Blueprint to Improve the Civil Justice System
(1992).
31. 102d Congress, 2d Sess., S. 2180 and its companion bill, H.R. 4155, both to
provide greater access to civil justice by reducing costs and delay, and for other
purposes.
32. Reprinted at 28 U.S.CA, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before Rule 1.
33. ABA Blueprint at xv.
34. Id. at 45.
35. Brookings Report at 9.
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for being a "piecemeal collection of proposals" that "do not make a
whole."36
Three of the most discussed potential avenues of reform are: (1)
to reduce demand for dispute resolution through the public civil justice system; (2) to increase judicial case management to improve efficiency; and Gl) to alter the fee system to shift costs to the losing side.
All of these avenues figured prominently in the Quayle Report, on
which we focus here, since it has had the greatest political support.
The Quayle Heport also proposed expert evidence reform and restric.
tions on punitive damages.
Reducinl~ demand for dispute resolution is a favored means of
reform. This means increased use of so-called alternative dispute resolution (ADR).37 Insofar as reforms concern the federal courts, it also
means shifting the burden of litigation elsewhere, namely to state
courts or to administrative agencies. 3s In the end, these proposals
come down either to judges encouraging parties to settle or to directing parties to go elsewhere. Such proposals have little to do with
a real reform of the civil justice system; they are additional recognition that the present system simply does not work. .
Proposals for increased "case management" are a bit closer to
real reform--at least in name. The Quayle Report calls on judges to
"take a hands on approach to case management,"39 which, the ABA
Blueprint supports. 40 Similarly, the Federal Courts Study Committee
Report endorses "the trend toward more vigorous ,case management
by district judges,"41 while the Brookings Report calls on judges to
"take a more active role in managing their cases"42 and the 1984 ABA
Report insists that "The judge must assume direct responsibility for
the pace of litigation, actively monitoring or directing the scheduling
of events in the life of the case. "43
Proposals for active case management are not the openings for
significant change. They are more of a tinkering with existing ways of
doing business than an introduction of meaningful new procedures.
According to the ABA Blueprint: "At base, however, caseflow management is u system controlled by the court that sets time limits for
completion of all phases of the case from filing to conclusion, monitors
36. ABA Blueprint at vii.
37. See Quayle Report at 15-16; ABA Blueprint at 31-43, 64-68; Federal Courts
Study Committee Report at 24-25; Brookings Report at 38.
38. See Quayle Report at 26-27; ABA Blueprint at 90-94; Federal Courts Study
Committee Report at 35-68. Many academics and federal judges would like to see the
federal courts operate as a system of constitutional courts and thus routinely oppose
proposals to increase the number of federal judges. They see these proposals as diluting the power and majesty of this portion of the bench.
39. At 20.
40. At 77.
41. At 100.
42. At 3.
43. At 8-9.
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each case to ensure that established deadlines are met, and enforces
management solutions to get cases that have fallen off schedule back
on track. "44
What active case management does not do is change fundamentally what happens in litigation. It does not require parties to focus
their pleadings on the issues in dispute. It does not force parties to
identify the evidence they intend to rely on to prove their case. It does
not limit the parties in discovery to material facts actually in dispute.
It does not restrict substantially the parties in making their discovery demands. It does not introduce a judge to conduct depositions or
to oversee document disclosure. About all it does do is make the judge
a glorified calendaring clerk.
The third major avenue of reform would permit movement toward imposing litigation costs on the losing side. This schemeknown in the United States as the "English Rule"-is highly controversial. It is so controversial that even the Quayle Report calls for its
introduction in only a very limited number of situations. 45 The Federal Courts Study Committee Report opposes the English rule,46 and
the ABA has likewise been hostile toward it.47 The existing rule is
defended so as to prevent discouraging parties "with plausible but not
clearly winning claims" (Federal Court~ Study Committee). Prospects
for adoption of fee-shifting do not seem .good.
Continental models have. had no significant role in the various
reform proposals of the last decade and have achieved only the most
fleeting of mentions in the various reports. The references are so
fleeting and trivial that they can all be summarized here. The Quayle
Report,48 the ABA Blueprint and the 1984 ABA Report all make no
references at all to Continental civil procedure. The Brookings Report
merely notes in a single sentence that "[U.S. lawyers] who have litigated abroad perceive U.S. litigation costs to be substantially higher
than those in foreign countries. "49 The far longer Federal Courts
Study Committee Report brings only a slightly greater comparative
perspective: it rejects out of hand the use of specialized courts such as
are found on the Continent ("most American lawyers find the ideal of
specialized courts repugnant"). The Quayle Report does make one
highly controversial reference to foreign systems: it claims that there
are far more lawyers per capita in the United States than in other
countries, e.g., 281 lawyers per 100,000 population in the U.S., but
44. At 77.
45. See i.e., discovery motions, at 18-19, and diversity cases (cases in federal court
based on state law), at.24-2S.
46. At 105.
47. See ABA Blueprint at 73,87-88, Appendix at 5.
48. Parallels in the Quayle Report to foreign procedures have been noted. See
Cortese, "Civil Justice Reform Speaks with a Foreign Accent," 1991 BNA Product
Safety & Liability Reporter 1193.
49. At 6.
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only 111 in Germany.50 It has engendered substantial discussion and
criticism. 51
II.

THE CHALLENGE OF GERMAN CIVIL PROCEDURE

Knowledge of foreign law is at a very low level in the United
States, not only among lawyers and judges, but even among academics. While there are a· few academics knowledgeable in foreign law,
the United States has nothing to compare to Germany's Max Planck
Institutes. 52 While the collapse of Communism has contributed to a
new awareness among American lawyers of law in other countries,
ironically, it has not led American lawyers to study foreign legal systems as an aid to reform their own. Instead, American lawyers are
holding out their system as a model for the formerly Communist
countries of Eastern Europe despite criticism of it at home. In the
same issue of the California Lawyer that reports that costs of civil
litigation are "out of control," the State Bar of California prescribes
"Borrowing Knowledge from the U.S. Legal System"!53 The same
ABA president who rejected Quayle's criticism at the 1991 convention, states that legal reform in Russia presents "a historic challenge
to the AmeIican legal profession-to lend support on a scale and
depth that only our nation has the resources to provide. "54 Many
American lawyers, even at the highest levels of the profession, believe that their system, despite its defects, is still the world's best. 55
Developing knowledge in the United States of the German civil
justice system· has been a slow process. The promising start in the
first third of the century was hardly helped by the political disaster of
the Nazi era. Even today, advocates of studying German civil proce50. At 2.
51. See, e.g., Galanter, Working Paper DPRP 10-10, "The Debased Debate on
Civil Justice," ut 10-19 (Madison WI: Institute for Legal Studies 1992); August, "The
Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers: America Doesn't Have 70% of the Earth's Lawyers,"
AB.AJ., September 1992, at 72; Epp, "Let's Not Kill All the Lawyers," Wall Street
Journal, July 9, 1992, at A15.
52. See Eric Stein's still current description of the dismal state of comparative
studies in the United States in "Uses, Misuses and Nonuses of Comparative Law," 72
Nw. U. L. Rev. 198, 209-16 (1977). Max Rheinstein commented in this journal on the
absence of Max Planck type institutes: "In the United States alone, no major research
institute of the kind has yet been established; legal research, even where it is concerned with the role of legal institutions in society, is still carried on as if nothing
could be gained from foreign phenomena and experiences." 5 Am. J. Compo L. 185, at
194 (1955).
53. Stone, lIupra n. 7, at 64.
54. D'Alemberte, "Our Eastern European Challenge," AB.AJ., March 1992, at 8.
55. For example, Justice Scalia, who is sometimes regarded as the "intellectual"
on the Supreme Court stated: "How else do you run a system? The only alternative [to
the U.S. system] is to go to the inquisitorial system and have an investigating judge,
And then you are going to lose or win depending on how good a judge you happen to
have gotten." F'rom "Ethics in America: Truth on Trial," recorded February 13, 1988
(Public Broadcasting System 1989).
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dure must reckon with dismissal as advocates of a Nazi-tainted
system.
While in many respects, the forced relocation of many first-rate
jurists that resulted from the turmoil in Europe enriched the American legal community, in the field of civil justice, no such enrichment
is apparent. Whether the reason for this was because a thorough-going reform was too far along by the time the emigres arrived in the
1930s or because civil procedure is more closely tied to the political
system than is substantive law or for some other reason may beleft
unanswered here. The clear fact is that the emigre generation had no
influence on comparative civil procedure. While the emigres noted
the defects of Common Law procedure, they shied away from active
criticism. 56

1. American Describers
A gradual building of American knowledge ofthe German system
began in the 25 years that followed the Second World War, when international studies in general enjoyed a boom in the United States.
Comparative legal studies benefited from that boom and U.S. law
professors turned their attention to how Continental legal systems
handle civil procedure. Grounds for this foreign study were more understanding how U.S. trading partners operate and less a search for
alternative solutions to American problems. 57 While United States
interest in international affairs has been in decline for two decades,
practical problems of civil procedure have worked to create some interest and knowledge of foreign procedure among a small circle of
judges and internationally active lawyers.68
56. See, e.g., Loewenstein, "Ketzerische Betrachtungen tiber die amerikanischen
Verfassung," in Der Staat als Aufgabe, Gedenkschrift fUr Max Imboden 233-54, at 250
(1972) (U.S. system suffers "notorious deficiencies." "It is an open secret that the administration of justice is one of the least exemplary aspects of American civilization,
even if the understandable class-interest of established jurists-judges as well as lawyers-precludes admitting it. Administration of justice is slow-it can be years before
there is the first hearing in court,- permeated by superfluous barriers to proceeding
and not infrequently takes place behind a a wall of privileges for corporate interests."
Authors' translation). For the influence of the emigres generally, see Marcus Lutter,
Ernst C. Stiefel & Michael H. Hoeflich (eds.), Der Einfluss deutscher Emigranten auf
die Rechtsentwicklungen in den USA und Deutschland (1993).
57. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, "phases of German Civil Procedure," 71
Harv. L. Rev. 1193-1268 (1958); Kaplan, "Civil Procedure: Reflections on the Comparison of Systems," 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 409 (1960); von Mehren, "Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure
and in the Federal Rules," 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 609-27 (1988); The Columbia Project on International Civil Procedure (which produced books on civil procedure in
France, Italy and. Sweden; the book on Sweden was co-authored by the newest appointment to the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
58. See, e.g., Gerber, "Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural
Systems: Germany and the United States," 34 Am. J. Compo L. 745 (1986); "International Discovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework," 82 Am.
J. Int'l L. 521 (1988); Shemanski, "Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of
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2. Langbein's Challenge: The German Advantage
In 1985, Professor Langbein, now of Yale University, published
an article with the plainly provocative title: "The German Advantage
in Civil Procf~dure."59 Langbein challenges American lawyers to consider whether their cherished system is truly second best. Langbein
in "The German Advantage" argues that the German system avoids
the most troublesome aspects of American procedure by assigning
judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts. He contends that
the United States should follow German experiences and restrict the
lawyers' role in fact-gathering. He recommends that· the United
States introduce judicial control and eventually judicial conduct of
fact-gathering.
Langbein in his article provides a straight-forward exposition of
certain fundamentals of German civil procedure which he contrasts
to their counterparts in American procedure. While Langbein's conclusions are purposely provocative and consequently controversial,
the contrastB he makes should not be, for they are patent to anyone
familiar with both systems. They are:
a) In Germany, the court has main responsibility for gathering and
evaluating evidence. The judge prepares the case, serves as principal
examiner and summarizes testimony. In the United States, each side
prepares its own case for presentation to the court. The judge remains passive, there is no judicial preparation of the ca!3e, the parties' lawyer8 serve as principal examiners, and there· are verbatim
transcripts of testimony.
b) In Germany, the judge controls the sequence of the case and considers issueB deemed central first. In the United States, each side's
lawyers first investigate the case fully in the discovery stage. Then
later, at trial, they present their cases in full, first plaintiff, then
defendant.
c) In Germany, witnesses are questioned for the first time by the
judge. In thf~ United States, lawyers for the parties prepare their witnesses prior to testimony.
d) In Germany, expert witnesses are chosen by the judge and are
supposed to be neutral. In the United States, expert witnesses are
chosen by the parties and function as advocates.

3. America Reacts to The German Advantage
Reaction to Langbein's article has been largely negative: the German system, it is argued, may not be as good as claimed, or the U.S.
Germany," 17 [nt'l Lawyer 465 (1983); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
u.S. District Court, 482 u.S. (1987). See Fisch, above n. 12, at 413.
59. Langbein, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1985).
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approach has special advantages or, in any event, the German system would not work in the U.S.60
a) First Reaction to the German Advantage: Skepticism
Professor Allen of Northwestern University is skeptical: he
makes a plea to Langbein for "more details and fewer generalities. "61
Allen criticizes Langbein for leaving his article at a high level of generality, but nonetheless acknowledges that "If the generalities that
[Langbein] invokes are true, then he has made a powerful argument
that the American system is decidedly inferior to the German system
in certain important respects and that we would do well to embrace
aspects of that system."
Allen complains that he cannot determine from Langbein's article the truth of Langbein's generalities. In particular, he is bothered
by the lack of empirical works to support Langbein's claims, and suspects that Langbein has emphasized the most negative appraisals of
the American system while relying on the most charitable appraisals
of the German.
Allen in his criticism of "The German Advantage" never escapes
from an American perspective. He repeatedly assumes-as is very
easy to do-greater similarities in the two systems than actually exist because of parallels in the problems they treat Allen challenges
"The German Advantage" by pointing out that variations in the German approach to a particular problem parallel those in the American
approach. What Allen overlooks, however, is that while problems in
the two systems may parallel each other, the variations between the
two systems are far more striking. This is apparent upon examination of several of Allen's principal criticisms:
Episodic or concentrated trial. Langbein writes about the
problems that American procedure creates through use of a single,
concentrated trial. The entire case must be fully discovered to avoid
surprise at trial. Allen counters that "courts in the United States
tend to deal with the matter.. .in a fashion at least somewhat analogous to Langbein's portrayal of the German response." Allen is right
60. Langbein had no reason to be surprised that there was no widespread acceptance of the Gennan system. A decade earlier he and others attempted a similar campaign against U.S. criminal procedure which led to similar results. Cf. Schlesinger,
"Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience," 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 361,363 (1977) (U.S. lawyers are possessed by a feeling of superiority that
seems to grow in direct proportion to the ever-increasing weight of the accumulating
evidence demonstrating the total failure of our system of criminal justice). At about
the same time as Langbein's civil procedure campaign, Maxeiner argued for a refonn
of the procedures for implementing antitrust law. Policy and Methods in German and
American Antitrust Law: A Comparative Study (1986). While commended in reviews,
Maxeiner's work was ignored.
61. Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, "The Gennan Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship,"
82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 705 (1988).
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that U.S. courts do sometimes grant continuances to deal with the
unexpected, but the usual case is dealt with in one concentrated proceeding and it is the usual case for which the attorneys must prepare.
A focused but limited inquiry is rarely possible under U.S.
procedures.
Coached or unprepared witnesses. Allen makes much of the fact
that the German prohibition on contacting witnesses has been loosened somewhat in recent years. ,This is true enough, but it does not
affect the basic difference. Coaching, ,as, .known in. the U.S., is unknown in GE~rmany. In the United States, on the other hand, contact
is the rule and coaching common.
Judicial control of fact-gathering. Allen acknowledges that the
German judge is constrained by the principle of party-presentation
(Verhandlungsmaxim) and by the principle of dispositive election
(Dispositionsmaxime) [the translations are Millar's] which limit the
judge's ability to control completely the gathering of facts. Allen is
not prepared to consider, however, the substantial qualitative difference between the roles of German and American judges in gathering
of facts. The German judge is active while the American is passive.
Experts, Allen states that he is unwilling to accept the anecdotal
evidence that experts in the American system, who are selected and
presented by the parties,. do align themselves with whomever pays
the fee. We think that the point is readily apparent to anyone involved in American litigation ap.d requires no proof. 62 Whether the
German system works better through use, or as Allen argues nonuse,
of court-appointed experts is another matter.
b) Second Reaction: The U.S. System Offers Unique
Advantages
Professor Samuel R. Gross of the University of Michigan takes a
different approach to "The German Advantage". He concedes readily,
if perhaps only for sake of argument, that the German system of civil
justice is cheaper, quicker and more predictable that the American.
Calling tho8e characteristics collectively efficiency, he then questions
whether efficiency is a virtue in a legal system. In other words,
Langbein's "German Advantage" is, after all, an illusion. Gross says
the American advantage is the value of inefficien~ litigation. 63
Gross argues that there are drawbacks to efficient systems. According to Gross, an efficient system is necessarily more specialized
and more difficult to operate that an inefficient one. "Completely cen62. See Walter K Olson, The Litigation Explosion, What Happened When
America Unlellshed the Lawsuit (1991) at 157 (partisan reliability has to come first);
Maxeiner, "The Expert in U.S. and German Patent Litigation," 1991 lIe Int'l Rev. of
Industrial Property & Copyright L. 595.
63. "The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation," 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 734 (198'7).
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tralized systems are not only harder to set up and more likely to
break down, but they break down more thoroughly."64 Gross draws
an analogy to the relationship between word processors and typewriters: the difficulties of setting up and using a word processor may
mean a typewriter may serve a particular user better. Of course,
Gross's argument works equally well against just about every advance of the modern era and fails just like his analogy-try to find a
typewriter in production in the United States today.
Gross contends that there is positive value in an inefficient system. His argument is that laws are often bad. An inefficient system
spares us from "the worst consequences of our foolishness. "65 In the
realm of civil justice, this inefficiency has the supposed salutary effect of increasing the range of conduct that is, as a practical matter,
beyond formal legal contro1.66 Gross concedes that what he calls a
virtue is often cited as the "essential vice" of the U.S. system. 67 The
validity of much of this argument has been challenged elsewhere. 68 It
is, in effect, an argument for a minimalist legal system. If that be the
goal, then better that choice be made explicitly.
Gross makes an argument that there is a "parochial" advantage
of inefficiency that concerns the peculiar position of judges in the
United States:
The German judge operates the judicial machinery of his system,
the American judge presides over his dominion; he has less control
but more prestige and authority. He also has a wider range of powers
and roles than his German counterpart, including uniquely American
opportunities to act on matters of public policy. To the extent that
this judicial policy-making role in valuable-and we seem to value
it-an inefficient judicial system may be a necessity. It would be difficult to justify, or to tolerate, allocating that sort of judicial power to
judicial officials if they had the means to implement their policies
directly and effectively.69
Gross is certainly correct that American judges historically have
a much greater role in policy-making than do any of their German
counterparts except those judges on the German Constitutional
Court. The tenacity with which American judges cling to that power
is likely to inhibit any reform of the justice system which would cause
judges to apply the law more and formulate it less.
64. Id. at 751.
65. Id. at 755.
66. Id. at 753.
67. Id. at 754.
68. See Bernstein, "Whose Advantage After All?: A Comment on the Comparison
of Civil Justice Systems," 21 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 587, 596-98 (1988).
69. Gross, supra n. 63, at 752 (emphasis in original).
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c) Third Reaction: The German Advantage Won't Work Here
Professor John Reitz ofthe University oflowa explains "Why We
Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure. "70
Reitz does not question Langbein's claimed advantages for German
civil procedure, but argues that the U.S. could not adopt judicially
dominated fact finding without changing other fundamental characteristics of U.S. civil procedure. He contends that cultural definitions
of the role of lawyer and judge preclude such changes. Reitz states
that "[U.S.] judges continue to view themselves -as umpires between
the contending parties, rather than government officials responsible
for determining the truth of the allegations."71 Since these roles are
dictated as much by "legal culture" as by positive law, they are, Reitz
contends, peculiarly difficult to change.
Reitz identifies several specific institutions of the American
"legal culture" which he believes make introduction of "The German
Advantage" difficult if not impossible:
Jury. According to Reitz, an active judge is potentially antagonistic to an impartial jury in those cases where the. parties do not
waive trial by jury.
Judges. Reitz points out that the German system requires judges
to prepare more for testimony than does the American system. To
implement such a system in the United States would require a substantial increase in the number of judges. Leaving financial considerations aside, such an increase would, according to Reitz,· make
political control of the judiciary more difficUlt. American judges focus
on their political, i.e.,· law making function, and not on court
administration.
Discovery. Reitz considers the U.S. institution of discovery to be
the strongest objection to the introduction of German style judicial
domination of witness examination. According to Reitz, the American
system of discovery puts the burden on the party opposing discovery
to justify why specific discovery should not be had, whereas the German system puts the burden on the party seeking disclosure. Reitz
states that maintaining discovery,.but putting it under the control of
the judge, would create an unacceptable risk of state abuse of discovery. The United States would face a danger of crusader judges. Judicial control of discovery would also, according to Reitz, create a
danger of delay, since it would introduce another person into the proceedings whose schedule would have to be accommodated. Therefore,
Reitz finds discovery the chief barrier to introduction of the German
advantage.
It is ironic that Reitz finds discovery the principal barrier to
adoption of the German advantage, for while the roles of judge and
70. Reitz, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987 (1990).
71. Id. at 992.
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jury are rooted deep in the history of the Anglo-American common
law, centuries before the United States became a nation, the institution of discovery as presently known was put into place in the lives of
U.S. lawyers practicing today. That that system-subject to such criticism today-should be spared change, suggests a remarkable lack of
flexibility. In any event, the whole thrust of Reitz's argument-we
just can't change-is a sad commentary on the openness of the American system to change.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The prospects for civil justice reform in the future are clouded.
The Republicans in the last election campaign tried to paint the Democrats as opposed to reform. Indeed, the American Trial Lawyers' Association-one of the groups that most vocally supports the status
quo-was a major contributor to the Clinton campaign. Still, the
Clinton presidency is not inalterably opposed to reform, as Dan
Quayle himself has pointed out.72 Moreover, the present miserable
state of American civil justice may be sufficiently intolerable to keep
the political pressure for reform on.
But what kind of reform is likely to result? Without knowledge of
European alternatives, reforms are likely to be piecemeal and minor,
at best-say along the lines of the Quayle Report. The entrenched
special interests are likely to see to that. Knowledge and interest in
foreign solutions, although greater than before, remain at a low level.
Very few American lawy~rs or law professors are able to deal with
foreign language works or even have an interest in having colleagues
who can. Not that much has changed since Karl Llewelyn told Stefan
Riesenfeld when he arrived in American in January 1935 that to
identify a legal idea as having a foreign origin is to give it the "kiss of
death."73 While U.S. lawyers may finally have recognized that they
ought to have something different, they still have not accepted that
that requires change and close examination of real alternatives. For
the moment, the average U.S. lawyer is apt to respond to attacks on
the legal system as did the ABA Section on Litigation, whose chairman-elect was quoted as saying: "Efforts to undermine confidence in
our entire system of justice does [sic] the country a great disservice.
We have at once the most emulated, thorough, democratic and fair
system of justice in the world."74
Ignorance is bliss.
72. Quayle, "Clinton is Right On Tort Reform, Wrong On Solution," Wall Street
Journal, May 27, 1993.
73. Riesenfeld, "Statement at Comparative Law Section Program," 1987 Association of American Law Schools Annual Convention. See also Jutta Klapisch, Der Ein·
fluss der deutschen und osterreichischen ETTl:igranten auf contracts of adhesion and
bargaining in good faith im US·amerikanischen Recht at 63 (1992).
74. Robert N. Saylor quoted in "Section Responds to Attacks on Legal System," 18
ABA Section of Litigation, Litigation News 5 (October 1992).

